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ABSTRACT 
The reliability of a cryogenic liquid storage 
vessel is assessed on the basis of failure statistics 
for other types of pressurized components such as boilers 
and unfired pressure vessels.  The design, construction, 
inspection and operating practices for boilers and 
unfired pressure vessels are compared to those for cryo- 
genic vessels to estimate the effects of any differences 
on the relative probability of failure of the vessel 
types. 
The possible modes of failure for a cryogenic stor- 
age vessel are investigated.  A fracture analysis is 
conducted to evaluate the fracture resistance qualities 
of the design.  The results demonstrated the high tol- 
erance the materials of construction have to flaws. 
On the basis of the areas evaluated, the probability 
of failure for the cryogenic liquid storage' yessel is 
judged to be lower in comparison to the conventional 
type vessels contained in the statistical data. 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
In quantifying reliability (or conversely, the 
failure rate), there are three (3) basic approaches 
which can be identified'1': 
1) stress/strength interference 
2) reliability testing 
3) evaluation of service failure data 
The stress/strength interference methodd)   £s an 
analytical approach that is used to find the probability 
of failure from known statistical distributions of 
"stress" and "strength" acting on the structure. 
Reliability testing(3,4) involves the demonstration 
of the equipment capability for meeting a specified 
reliability.  The general approach to reliability testing 
is that the desired reliability is known and the quantity 
of data necessary to establish this fact with a certain 
degree of confidence is to be determined.  In highly 
reliable equipment such as pressure vessels and piping, 
it.is almost impossible, both in cost and time to conduct 
statistically meaningful reliability testing. 
By the third method, the failure rate is calculated 
on the basis of actual service history'  .  This approach 
to reliability evaluation is highly recommended in many 
design applications. 
For this report, the third approach is used to 
assess the reliability of a cryogenic liquid storage 
vessel.  The limitation to this approach however, is 
that adequate operating experience of cryogenic liquid 
storage vessels with respect to the number of vessel 
years of service and number of reported defects is 
far too limited to permit a direct statistical infer- 
ence as to the probability of failure.  There does 
however exist a sizeable amout of statistical data 
on the failures of more conventional type pressure 
vessels.  The objective of this study is to estimate 
the probability of failure of the cryogenic storage 
vessel on the basis of this statistical data.  In 
support of this objective the following approach is 
taken: 
1) A review of the industry practices is made 
in the areas of design, materials, fabri- 
cation and inspection. 
2) The possible modes of failure associated with 
a cryogenic storage vessel are investigated. 
3) The available failure statistics of boiler 
and pressure vessels are reviewed.  A com- 
parison of the construction practices of 
boiler and pressure vessels with those for 
cryogenic storage vessels is made to estimate 
the effects of any differences on the relative 
probability of failure of the two types. 
4) Based on the above findings, an estimate is 
made on the probability of failure of the 
cryogenic vessel. 
1.1   VESSEL 
The basis for the assessment is a cryogenic storage 
vessel which has been in service for approximately twelve 
(12) years.  The vessel can generally be described as a 
flat-bottom, double-walled design with the inner vessel 
having a rated capacity for holding 600,000 gallons of 
liquid.  As illustrated in Figure 1-1, the inner vessel 
rests on foam block insulation and the annular space 
between the inner and outer vessels is filled with perlite 
powder insulation and the insulation is constantly purged 
with dry nitrogen gas.  The inner vessel is designed with 
a vapor space equivalent to five percent of its rated 
capacity.  The change in pressure in the vapor space as 
a result of boil-off, filling or withdrawing of liquid 
is controlled by a pressure control system which main- 
tains the vapor space below the design pressure.  The 
components in such a design which comprise the pressure 
boundary include the inner vessel and the piping 
connected to it which terminates at the thermal sleeves 
on the outer vessel.  Table 1-1 lists the pertinent 
parameters of the vessel design. 
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CRYOGENIC LIQUID STORAGE VESSEL 
FIGURE 1-1 
TABLE   1-1 
SUMMARY   OF   DESIGN   PARAMETERS 
Inner Vessel  and  Piping 
Design  Pressure 34.5  kPa(5  psig)   plus  Liquid 
Head   (31145.4   kg/m-*(71.5   lb/ft3) 
Design  Temperature        77°K(-320°F) 
Operating  Pressure        20.7  kPa(3  psig) 
External loadings   Seismic-10% 
Materials of        Vessel:  9% Nickel Steel 
Construction        Piping:  304 Stainless Steel 
Construction Method Welded 
Outer Vessel 
Design Pressure      .5 kPa(2 IN H2o) plus 
insulation 
Design Temperature   29 4°K(70°F) 
Material of Structural Carbon Steel 
Construction 
Construction Method  Welded 
In normal operating service, the vessel is filled 
to approximately seventy-five (75) percent of its rated 
capacity.  Part of this is held in reserve while the 
balance is used in filling other smaller cryogenic 
vessels.  Over a period of one week, the liquid level 
drops to twenty-five (25) percent of normal capacity 
as a result of the filling operations. 
1.2   LIMITATION IN SCOPE 
The failure probability developed in this report is 
based on normal operation of the vessel.  It does not 
include failures caused by accident conditions, natural 
disasters or sabotage.  The probability of vessel failures 
from such accidents would have to be derived from system 
analysis to determine the probability of the accident 
and calculations to determine the resulting stresses in 
the vessel. 
2.   CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES 
2.1   INTRODUCTION 
The quality level initially built into the vessel 
considered here is an important factor in the expected 
service reliability.  This quality level is related 
directly to the practices used to design and construct 
the vessel.  The documents which prescribed the material, 
design, fabrication and testing requirements for the 
vessel under study were provided by the following codes 
and standards: 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codca, Section VIII, 
Division 1 
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Code Case 
1308-5 
API Standard 620, Appendix R" 
ANSI B31.3, Pressure Piping Code 
API Standard 620, Appendix R'*>) is best suited for 
a,design of the vessel type under study.  These rules 
cover the construction of large, flat bottom, welded, 
low pressure above ground storage vessels.  At the time 
of vessel construction, this Appendix R was limited to 
vessels containing refrigerated liquids with design  
aThe ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code will be referred 
to elsewhere as the "ASME Code" along with its various 
sections. 
Section I    Power Boilers 
Section III   Nuclear Power Plant Components 
Section V    Non-destructive Examinations 
Section VIII  Pressure Vessels (Division 1 and 2) 
Section IX   Welding Procedures and Qualifications 
temperatures down to 222°K(-60°F).  The ASME Code(7) 
however, along with Code Case 1308-5^) provided the 
rules to meet the minimum design temperature require- 
ments of 77°K(-320°F) . 
Code Case 1308-5 established the requirements for 
the use of the 9% nickel steel for the low temperature 
service.  It defines the material requirements for manu- 
facturing including chemical composition, heat treatment, 
tensile testing and impact testing.  In addition, the 
allowable stress levels and fabrication requirements, 
including weld procedure and performance qualification 
are also defined.  As a result, a combination of API 
Standard 620, ASME Section VIII and Code Case 1308-5 
were used in the construction of the inner vessel. 
The piping between the inner and outer vessels was 
constructed to the rules of ANSI D31.3^9^.  This section 
of the pressure piping code covers the design and con- 
struction of piping for use within a chemical plant or 
petroleum refinery.  In this section of the report, the 
coverage and adequacy of the Codes of Construction are 
reviewed along with the measures taken by the owner/ 
operator to enhance the quality level.  From this review, 
an assessment is made on the quality level of the vessel 
and piping with respect to the level of those vessels 
contained in the statistical data in Section 4. 
2.2   MATERIALS 
The materials of construction include quench and 
tempered 9% Ni steel for the vessel and nozzles and 304 
stainless steel for the annular space piping.  In 
selecting the materials for a low temperature application, 
the primary concern is the effect of the low temperature 
on the material toughness.  9% Ni steel was developed in 
the 1940's to meet the needs of cryogenic applications. 
The material has a relatively high strength and retains 
high toughness levels down to liquid nitrogen tempera- 
tures 77K(-320°F)(10-12)_  Tnc gGnGrai effect of a 
decrease in temperature is an increase in the yield and 
tensile properties of the material.  As shown in Table 
2.1, the yield and tensile strengths increase 56% and 
52% respectively over room temperature strength prop- 
erties for the 9% Ni steel.  With the allowable stress 
criteria for this vessel being based on the tensile 
properties at room temperature, the result is a more 
conservative design when operating at the low service 
temperatures. 
9% Ni steel has been used extensively in contain- 
ments for the overseas transporting of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG).  Unlike stationary tanks, the tanks on LNG 
carriers are subjected to static and dynamic loadings 
resulting from ship motion.  A fail safe approach has 
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TABLE   2.1 
9%  Ni   Steel d2) 304   Stainless   Steel (26) 
294K(70°F) 77K(-320°F)      294K(70°F)      77K(-320°F) 
Tensile  Strength,   MPaW(KSI)             760(110) ,,=„„„, 
/buuioj 1150(167) 566(82) 1524(221) 
Yield  Strength,   MPa   (KSI) 585(85) 
Elongation   (50.8  mm)   % 20 
920(133) 241(35) 209(39] 
32 60 40 
been taken in the design of these vessels, e. i., the 
vessel design is based on the 'leak-before-break 
criteria * (13/14)< ^0  meet this criteria, extensive 
fracture mechanics studies(14-24) have been conducted 
to examine the configuration and propagation rate of 
the through cracks in light of the fracture toughness 
of 9% Ni steel.  The results of these studies will be 
used in Section 3 to assess the fracture behavior 
related to this design. 
Also shown in Table 2.1 are the increases in the 
yield and tensile strengths of 304 stainless steel at 
the operating temperature.  The material has been found 
to exhibit good ductility and toughness down to 
20K(-423°F)(25).  In addition, results of impact tests 
indicate that the material is very stable over long 
periods of exposure and does not exhibit any marked 
degradation of toughness'^o). 
2.3   DESIGN 
The rules of the Codes of Construction to which the 
vessel and piping were designed provide formulas which 
establish the wall thickness necessary to maintain the 
average membrane stress below the allowable stress 
limits.  The formulas are based on the assumption that 
there is continuous elastic action throughout the member 
and the stresses are evenly distributed.  To account for 
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the high localized and secondary bending stresses which 
exist when designing and fabricating to these design 
rules, safety factors and design rules for details are 
incorporated to hold such stresses at a safe level.  The 
design rules for details include such approaches as the 
area replacement method for the reinforcement of 
openings.  With respect to safety factors, an allowable 
membrane stress of 163.8 MPa (23,750 psi) for the 9% 
nickel steel and 129.6 MPa (18,800 psi) for the 304 
stainless steel was used in designing the vessel and 
piping.  By this criteria, a safety factor of 4 which 
is based on the ultimate tensile strength of the materials 
at room temperature has been built into the vessel design. 
This margin of safety is further increased if the 
increase in strength of the material is considered at the 
operating temperature. 
Additional safety factors are incorporated into the 
design formulas to account for the type of weld design 
and nondestructive testing.  These will be noted when 
discussing the various components. 
2.3.1   LOADINGS.   With respect to the inner vessel, the 
significant loading conditions are the internal pressure 
within the vapor space, the loading of the liquid head 
and the reaction loads from the attachments.  The most 
critical attachments being the piping and the anchor 
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brackets.  The pressure within the vapor space is held 
constant whereas the change in liquid level as a result 
of filling or withdrawing of liquid creates a cyclic 
pressure loading condition.  In addition to the internal 
pressure and liquid head loads, the fill and withdrawal 
pipes are subjected to thermal cyclic loading.  The 
effects of the cyclic conditions will be further inves- 
tigated in Section 3. 
2.3.2 SHELL.  The shell of the vessel consists of six 
(6) courses ranging in thickness from 6.35 mm at the top 
to 8.66 mm at the bottom (.250 to .341 inch) with' four 
(4) stiffening rings evenly spaced along the outside of 
the shell.  The shell was designed for the loadings due 
to pressure within the vapor space and the liquid head 
at the various levels.  The wall thickness of the lower 
three (3) courses was determined with a weld efficiency 
factor of 1.0 while an efficiency factor of .85 was 
used on the remaining courses.  These efficiency factors 
correspond to 100% and spot radiography of the shell 
longitudinal welds.  The courses were joined in the 
longitudinal and circumferential direction by full 
penetration, double butt-weld joints. 
2.3.3 DOME (ROOF).  The spherically shaped roof is 
constructed from 4.76 mm (3/16 inch) thick plates which 
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are joined by double-lap weld joints. These joints are 
designed to have a minimum overlap of 25.4 mm (1.0 inch) 
with a 4.76 mm (3/16 inch) two (2) pass fillet weld 
on the outside and a single pass seal, weld on the inside. 
The wall thickness was established on the basis of the 
external loads resulting from the weight of the insul- 
ation and roof.  The minimum wall thickness required to 
withstand the internal loading due to 34.4 kPa (5 psig) 
design pressure in the vapor space was determined to be 
2.59 mm (.102 inch).  In calculation this thickness, an 
efficiency factor of .45 was incorporated into the 
design formula. This factor includes a weld joint 
efficiency factor of .56 and an allowable stress reduc- 
tion of .80. 
The joining of the dome ±o  the shell is accomplished 
by means of a compression ring.  This ring is provided 
for the purpose of resisting the circumferential force 
at the juncture due to the pressure loading on the dome. 
The rules for the design of this ring are defined in 
API Standard 620 wherein the minimal cross sectional 
area of the compression ring region is determined on 
basis of an allowable compressive stress of 103.4 MPa 
(15/000 psi).  By this method, the design of the com- 
pression ring exceeds the minimum area requirement by 
30%. With regards to the weld design, a double full- 
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fillet lap joint with 4.76 nun (3/16 inch) fillet welds 
was used in connecting the dome to the compression ring. 
The shell to compression ring joint was a full pene- 
tration weld with a 6.35 mm (1/4 in^^T) fillet weld on 
the outside. 
2.3.4  FLAT BOTTOM. As will illustrated in Figure 1.1, 
the inner vessel and contents are supported by the block 
insulation and concrete foundation under the entire flat 
bottom section of the vessel.  The forty-eight (48) anchor 
bars which are evenly spaced and attached along the lower 
end of the shell are provided to secure the inner vessel 
and to resist the upward lifting force due to the pressure 
loading of the vapor space and the liquid head.  The 
flat-bottom is constructed from 4.76 mm (3/16 inch) thick 
plates and are joined by single two (2) pass fillet lap 
joints. The outer section of the flat-bottom is comprised 
of an annular ring 7.62 mm (.30 inch) thick and is butt 
welded to provide a flat surface for connecting to,the 
shell. 
The shell to floor joint follows the weld design 
rules outlined by the ASME Code Section VIII for the 
forming of a corner joint. The attachment is made with 
a full penetration butt weld and reinforced with a 
6.35 mm (1/4 inch) fillet weld on the outside. This 
joint will develop secondary bending stresses when 
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the shell is subjected to pressure from the liquid head 
and vapor pressure.  In analyzing this joint as a fixed 
connection, the secondary bending stresses were found 
to be within allowable limits for a more detailed stress 
analysis<27"30). 
The radial end force transmitted through the ring 
acts on the single full-fillet lap joint which joins 
the flat-bottom to the ring.  In analyzing as a non- 
symmetrically loaded fillet weld(31)t  the stresses induced 
by the radial end load for the maximum loading condition 
is determined to be less than 20% of the allowable stress. 
2.3.5  ANCHOR SYSTEM.  The anchor bars are attached to 
the side of the shell by means of a bracket and keeper 
bar. The arrangement of a typical bar is illustrated 
in Figure 2-1. During the assembly of the anchor system, 
the welding of the keeper to anchor bar is completed 
when the vessel is preloaded with water. This action 
results in a loading on the foundation equivalent to 
89% of the cryogenic liquid weight at maximum capacity. 
The limitation in achieving equivalent liquid weight is 
due to the higher density of the cryogenic liquid. At 
various intervals during the filling operation, the 
elevation of the foundation is measured and is again 
checked when the vessel is drained.  By securing in this 
17 
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TYPICAL ANCHOR ARRANGEMENT 
FIGURE 2-1 
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manner/ settlement of the foundation is verified and 
any possible direct loading on the flat-bottom is mini- 
mized. 
With regards to the design of the anchor arrangement 
and in particular the attachment of the bracket to shell, 
the API Standard 620 recognizes such arrangements but 
provides no specific design formulas.  In addressing 
this subject, the Standard states 
"...members shall be designed in accordance 
with good structural engineering practices..." 
and 
"...that the reaction therefrom will not cause 
excessive localized or secondary stresses in the 
walls of the tank." 
From the information available, the design analysis 
of the anchor system was limited to establishing the 
maximum stresses in the anchor bar. The adequacy of 
the entire anchor arrangement is verified by the pneu- 
matic test which was completed after final assembly of 
the inner vessel.  Since the pneumatic test was conducted 
at 1.25 times the design pressure of 34.5 kPa (5 psig) 
and with the normal operating pressure being 20.7 kPa 
(3 psig), a minimum safety factor of 2.1 can be estab- 
lished for this design arrangement.  If wanted, a further 
increase in this margin can be achieved by reducing the 
operating pressure.  For a 6.9 kPa (1 psig) drop in the 
operating pressure, the safety factor would be equal to 
3.1, an increase of approximately fifty (50) percent. 
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Further assurance on the integrity of this design 
arrangement can be realized when the following facts are 
considered: 
1) Except for the infrequent occasion when the 
vessel is taken out of service, the loading 
is steady on the anchor system. 
2) The material possesses good ductile properties 
and yielding at these highly stressed loca- 
tions on the vessel will allow for the distri- 
bution of these stresses to adjacent under- 
stressed areas. 
Also to be noted is the fact that the failure of the 
anchor system would be a reBult of overpressurization. 
Therefore, failure of the anchor system is directly 
related to the probability of failure of the safety 
relief devices to function. 
2.3.6  NOZZLES.  A total of ten (10) nozzles ranging 
in pipe size from 1 to 18 inches penetrate the boun- 
daries of the vessel. By the design rules of API 
Standard 620, the attachment of these nozzles requires 
that a minimum reinforcement be added to compensate 
for the weakening effect of the opening.  The design 
rules are based on the commonly known "area replacement 
method" which requires sufficient reinforcing material 
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to be placed immediately adjacent to the opening in a 
prescribed manner to evenly distribute the stress 
concentrations.  The method is simple in approach and 
has been verified by both analytical and experimental 
techniques ^-2-35) # rpjjg design rules determine the 
amount of reinforcement as well as the boundary limits 
for the reinforcing material to be effective. The 
design rules are limited, however, to determining 
the reinforcement for the internal pressure loadings 
of the vessel.  For the external loadings associated 
with the piping, other methods, not provided by either 
API Standard 620 or ASME Code, need to be used to 
determine the effects on the vessel. 
For this reason a detailed analysis was performed 
on a typical nozzle attachment. The 4 inch product 
outlet line which is connected to the flat bottom 
floor was selected and analyzed using the' computer 
program, Pipdyn II. The results of this computer 
analysis provided the reaction loads which would be 
transmitted through the nozzle onto the vessel.  In 
establishing these reactions, the loadings due to 
pressure and deadweight, along with thermal movement 
of the vessel and piping, were considered in the 
analysis.  The reaction loads from this analysis were 
then used to determine the local stresses in the area 
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of the nozzle attachment^36).  By this approach, the 
stresses were found to be within the allowable stress 
criteria as defined by Division 2 of ASME Code Section 
VIII. 
In continuing the investigation on the adequacy of 
the nozzle design, the nozzle attachment was reviewed 
, for its resistance to fatigue. This area of the vessel 
represents the greatest exposure to cyclic loads.  In 
addition, from the failure statistics on pressure 
vessels, a large number of failures are attributed 
to fatigue at the nozzle attachment. The Codes of 
Construction require cyclic loadings to be considered. 
but provide no specific details on their treatment. 
The fatigue evaluation was based on the set of 
rules in Division 2 of the ASME Code, Section VIII. 
The rules evaluate the need for a detailed fatigue 
analysis on the basis of the number of cyclic loads 
and resulting stresses and the temperature differences 
between points within the area being studies.  In this 
evaluation, the cyclic loadings due to piping reactions 
were also considered.  By this approach, the nozzle area 
met all the applicable requirements of the rules and 
further analysis was not necessary. 
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2.3.7  PIPING. The piping in the annular space 
contains such construction features as seamless pipe 
and full penetration butt weld joints.  The significant 
loadings imposed on the piping are a result of the 
effects of thermal contraction. The piping which 
serves in the filling or withdrawing of liquid from 
the vessel are also exposed to thermal cycling which 
occurs during the filling or withdrawing operation. 
To account for the effects of thermal contraction, 
the piping runs contain loops to provide the needed 
flexibility.  The loops are designed to minimize the 
reaction loads acting on the vessel and to keep the 
stresses in the pipe run within acceptable limits. 
By the empirical equation in the Piping Code, suffi- 
cient flexibility exists in the pipe runs and further 
detailed analysis is not required.  Using this equa- 
tion, however, the Piping Code warns that there is no 
assurance that the reaction loads will be acceptably 
low.  In order to confirm the adequacy of the piping 
flexibility, the computer analysis of a typical line 
as previously described was completed to determine 
the reaction loads and the stresses within the piping 
run.  The reaction loads were shown to be Of no conse- 
quence in the analysis of the nozzle to shell attachment, 
The ANSI B16.3 Piping Code recognizes the effects 
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of cyclic loading and accounts for this fact by requiring 
a stress reduction factor to be included in the formula 
for establishing the allowable stress limit.  This • 
factor is based on the expected number of temperature 
cycles over the service life.  Using the lowest factor 
of .5, which accounts for cycles in excess of 100,000, 
results in an allowable stress of 92 MPa (13,350 psi). 
The stresses as determined by the computer analysis were 
found to be within this stress limit. 
2.4   FABRICATION & INSPECTION 
The measures taken during the fabrication phase 
have a significant effect on the quality of the vessel. 
The importance placed on this phase is evident when 
reviewing today's construction practices wherein there 
is the requirement for a detailed quality control 
program which is aimed primarily at fabrication 
control(37)#  For the vessel under study, the Codes of 
Construction provided essential measures to insure a 
safe and reliable vessel.  These fabrication measures 
are directed toward the details, controls, nondestruc- 
tive examinations and tests performed during the vessel 
construction.  In reviewing, such required details as 
cutting, forming, fitting, and cleaning were contained 
within the certified engineering drawings. A high 
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degree of control was found to be exercised in the area 
of material and welding. Material control can be traced 
to the time of material manufacture where additional 
testing was completed to assure the strength, ductility 
and toughness of the material to meet the low tempera- 
ture service. 
As the material was received at the job sight, it 
was visually inspected for defects and checked for 
traceability to the mill test reports by owner/operator 
Inspectors. Material identification during construction 
was established by the assigning of a unique piece mark 
utilizing the drawing number as the prefix.  This piece 
mark identification is shown on the drawing for the 
particular item and was affixed by the fabricator on 
each item upon receipt from the material manufacturer. 
This identification practice is an important aid in 
preventing the use of improper or nonconforming 
materials during fabrication. 
In the area of welding, controls were established 
over the three (3) key elements which, in combination, 
make it possible to repeatedly achieve welds of suitable 
quality and known properties.  The three (3) key 
elements include the weld procedure, welder, and 
examination of the weld. 
Weld procedures were generated to define and docu- 
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merit the essential details in welding the specific 
materials.  Such details as process, base metal, filler 
metal, joint configuration and power input were included 
as part of the weld procedure.  These procedures were 
also qualified in accordance with the requirements in 
Section IX of the ASME Code.  The procedure qualifi- 
cation was based on the results of testing to determine 
the strength, ductility, soundness, and adequacy of 
fusion. This testing was conducted at the minimum 
design temperature as was the additional impact testing 
to determine the notch ductility of the weld metal and 
the heat affected zone. 
Control df the welder was maintained by qualifying 
the welders to the applicable requirements in Section IX 
of the ASME Code.  By these requirements, welders were 
qualified on the basis of testing to produce a sound 
weld in accordance with the qualified weld procedure. 
The testing also included details which, for the most 
part, represent the actual weld conditions to be encoun- 
tered during fabrication. Also, as part of the welder 
control, records of ti\e  qualifications on each welder 
were maintained by the fabricator and each welder was 
assigned an identifying symbol which was stamped by 
the welder on his work.       x 
With regards to examination, the measure of soundness 
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and final quality of the welds is based on the number 
and extent of nondestructive examinations conducted 
and the sensitivity of the methods employed to detect 
any flaws within the welds.  The nondestructive exam- 
ination program utilized in the construction included 
visual, radiographic, liquid penetrant, solution film, 
and vacuum box examinations.  The longitudinal joints 
in the lower three (3) courses of the shell and all 
weld joints in the piping were 100% radiographically 
examined.  Spot radiography was conducted on the 
remaining longitudinal and all circumferential welds 
in the shell.  Liquid penetrant examination was used 
to detect any surface flaws after the removal of tem- 
porary attachments and on the corner weld that joins 
the shell to the flat bottom. The dome was inspected 
by solution film examination and the flat-bottom lap 
joints were examined by the vacuum box technique. 
The nondestructive examinations were performed 
by trained personnel to the requirements and acceptance 
standards established by Section V of the ASME Code. 
The acceptance standards for each specified nondes- 
tructive examination has evolved from experience over 
the years.  They are based on high fabrication quality 
through superior workmanship using proven fabrication 
practices.  Service experience with pressure vessels and 
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boilers has demonstrated the general adequacy of these 
standards. 
Another noteworthy point concerning the nondes- 
tructive examinations is the time of performance. For 
this purpose, the performing of these examinations is 
discussed with respect to the hydro-pneumatic test. 
Prior to this test, the radiographic, liquid pene- 
trant, and vacuum box examinations were completed in 
the particular areas.  The vessel was given a visual 
examination after filling with water and once again 
after reducing the pressure from the test to operating 
condition. At this time the dome was inspected by 
solution film method. A visual examination was also 
made on the anchor system after draining the vessel 
and repressurizing to design condition. After com- 
pleting all testing, the flat-bottom and corner weld 
of the shell to flat-bottom were once again examined 
by the vacuum box technique. 
The performance of these nondestructive examinations 
however, does not assure that all flaws will be detected 
since the examination techniques do have limitations in 
detecting certain flaw geometries.  In addition, human 
error also limits the effectiveness of the nondestructive 
program. To compensate for these limitations, relia- 
bility is best assured by the use of materials which have 
28 
toughness characteristics to meet the conditions of 
service.  As will be shown in Section 3, the materials 
of construction possess these toughness characteristics 
which make them tolerant to flaws. 
2.5 TESTING 
As mentioned, a hydro-pneumatic test was performed 
following the completion of fabrication.  The test sub- 
jected the vessel to an overpressure of 25% greater than 
the design pressure.  Except for very localized areas of 
geometric discontinuities, the stress created by this 
test is significantly below the yield point of the 
materials of construction.  For the major portion of 
the design, the test stress is well within the elastic 
range. 
By this test the vessel integrity is confirmed by 
exposing excessive deformations, faulty materials, or 
leaks.  The test also provides a means of attaining 
shakedown in localized stress regions where peak 
stresses exceed the yield strength.  Shakedown by 
local plastic deformation permits subsequent loading 
responses to be elastic. 
2.6 ADDITIONAL MEASURES 
The owner/operator took several noteworthy steps 
in an effort to achieve a vessel of highest quality. 
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These measures included the following: 
A design specification was prepared wherein the 
specific functions and complete range of operating 
conditions were defined.  In addition, thermal and 
mechanical loads which the vessel Would be expected 
to withstand during service were detailed in the 
specification. From the failure statistics, a number 
of the vessel failures reported are associated with 
conditions not intended by design. The importance 
of the design specification in establishing the design 
parameters is recognized by the ASME Code and is a 
requirement for Section VIII Division 2 and Section 
III vessel designs. 
All engineering documents were required to be 
submitted to the owner/operator for approval. These 
documents included such items as the detail drawings 
of the vessel and piping, design calculations, and 
welding procedures. These documents were reviewed by 
the competent individuals involved in generating the 
design specification. In addition, certified as-built 
drawings were required after completion of the vessel. 
The owner/operator furnished on-site inspection to 
monitor all operations, examinations and tests.  In 
addition, the owner/operator required the right to 
witness fit-ups, welding, and nondestructive testing 
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and to review such items as reports of examinations 
and tests, radiographs, repair procedures.  This 
measure, along with the document approval requirement, 
can be considered as fulfilling the inspection require- 
ment of the Codes of Construction. 
2.7  ADEQUACY OF THE CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES 
The review provides strong evidence to support 
the belief that for the intended service the quality 
level is comparable to and in some areas better than 
that of the high quality vessels that form the basis 
of the failure statistics.  The reasons can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) Extensive studies have established the behavior 
of the materials of construction at the low temperature 
service for this design and the suitability of these 
materials has been demonstrated by the acceptable 
service performance in vessels of similar construction. 
In addition, the control measures to establish the 
strength, toughness and ductility at the low temperature 
assures consistent material properties. These same 
controls were imposed on the weld and heat affected zone 
to assure the same mechanical properties as the base 
metal. 
2) The design of the pressure boundary components 
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was based on the design formulas in Division 1 of the 
ASME Code, Section VIII using an allowable stress limit 
equal to one-fourth (1/4) the ultimate tensile strength 
and the applicable efficiency factors.  The detailed 
analysis of the more critical areas where local stresses 
could be significant showed the stresses to be within 
the allowable limits as defined for the type of analysis. 
The computer analysis of a typical pipe line demonstrated 
the adequacy of the piping design.  The loops within the 
lines provide adequate flexibility to keep the reaction 
loads on the vessel and the stresses within the pipe to 
acceptable limits. 
3) The design specification prepared by the owner/ 
operator defined the appropriate design and operating 
conditions of the system.  The requirement for docu- 
ment approval by the owner/operator provides assurance 
that the manufacturer properly interpreted the design 
specification and provided another check for any gross 
oversights which could potentially lead to a failure. 
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3.  POSSIBLE MODES OF FAILURE 
3.1   INTRODUCTION 
By ASME Code criteria^387,   the modes of failure to 
be considered when designing a pressure vessel include: 
(1) Plastic collapse 
(2) Excessive deformation 
(3) Instability 
(4) Fatigue failure 
(5) Material failure 
(a) Brittle fracture 
(b) Creep 
(c) Corrosion 
Not all are relevant to a design of the type under study 
and some failures result from a combination of the above 
modes as will be discussed. 
Instability which may be elastic or inelastic is 
generally associated with compressive stresses in thin 
members and would not be a dominating factor in this 
internally pressurized vessel.  Likewise, creep failure, 
which is a result of slow continuous plastic deformation 
shown by materials at elevated temperatures, would not be 
possible at the low temperature. 
With the system designed to the codes of construction 
previously discussed, failure by excessive elastic or 
plastic deformation is extremely remote. As discussed 
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the design formulas are based on elastic stress analysis 
and incorporate a safety factor of four (4). 
Of the more common types of corrosion, stress 
corrosion is an important consideration for many vessels 
because of the wide range of susceptible materials and 
aggressive environments.  To date, however, stress 
corrosion has not been reported to occur at cryogenic 
temperatures(39,40). The reason for stress corrosion 
being less a problem in cryogenic designs is attri- 
buted to the low temperatures which preclude the exis- 
tence of an aggressive environment.  Hydrogen embrit- 
tlement is also classified as a form of corrosion.  With 
high strength steels, embrittlement can occur giving low 
ductility resulting in brittle type failures associated 
with delayed cracking. At cryogenic temperatures, how- 
ever, cracking due to hydrogen embrittlement has not been 
observed(39»4*) . 
The brittle fracture and fatigue modes of failure 
are the most common types of pressure vessel failures 
and present the greatest concern.  Brittle fracture is 
the most dangerous of the failure types since it occurs 
at stresses considerably below the yield point and with- 
out prior noticeable deformation.  Service failures have 
shown that brittle fractures are initiated by small flaws 
that grow to critical size^42^.  The temperature of the 
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material as well as the stress state also contribute in 
the failure mechanism. 
Fatigue is considered to account for a larger per- 
centage of failures and often precedes the onset of 
brittle failure.  Since the end result of fatigue failure 
is not always catastrophic, fatigue failure is normally 
ranked second in importance to brittle fracture, even 
though it is more common. 
The key element in these types of failures is the 
initiation or existence of a flaw or notch. In reality, 
all vessels will contain flaws of some type or size such 
as metal imperfections, weld defects or local variations 
from the design geometry or surface finish. The nondes- 
tructive testing and inspection during the fabrication 
phase provide a means for minimizing these flaws. 
3.2   FRACTURE MECHANICS APPROACH 
Linear elastic fracture mechanics provides an 
approach to fracture control and is used in this study 
to assess the fracture safeness of the design. This 
approach has been adopted by the ASME and is incorporated 
into Section III and Section IX for the design and evalu- 
ation of flaws of nuclear pressure vessels. The fracture 
mechanics approach to fatigue assessment makes the assump- 
tion that cracks or crack-like discontinuities are present 
from the onset.  Therefore, the problem of crack initia- 
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tion is of no consequence and only the crack propagation 
need be considered in the fatigue process.  In applying 
the fracture mechanics to design, the material proper- 
ties of interest are the fracture toughness which is 
used to compute critical crack sizes and the fatigue 
crack growth rate which is used to estimate the cycle 
life expectancy ^29f 42) . 
3.3   FRACTURE MECHANICS ANALYSIS<29r43,44) 
To assess the fracture resistance qualities of the 
design, a fatigue crack growth analysis was performed. 
Crack depths varying from 2.16 to 6.35 mm (.065 to .250 
in) were analyzed to determine the sensitivity of the 
results to the initial flaw depth assumption. The flaws 
are assumed to be located in the shell, nozzle and piping. 
3.3.1  CYCLIC CONDITIONS.  The design cyclic conditions 
are based on a conservative estimate of the magnitude 
and frequency of the temperature and pressure transients 
which result during normal operation. The cyclic pressure 
loading is a result of the change in liquid head which 
occurs on a weekly basis. During periods when there is 
no withdrawing of liquid from the vessel, the associated 
piping in the annular space will begin to warm. A tem- 
perature gradient develops through the length of the line 
due to the cold inner vessel and ambient temperature 
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conditions of the outer vessel. To account for this 
condition, the very conservative assumption is made 
that the temperature in the entire line through to the 
nozzle connection rises to ambient state once a day. 
The total number of cycles for these transient condit- 
ions are assumed to occur over an estimated forty (40) 
year operating life. i; 
3.3.2  STRESSES. The stresses used for this evaluation 
appear in Table 3.1 and are derived from the review 
conducted in Section 2. The shell stress represents the 
highest circumferential value as a result of the change 
in liquid head. This stress condition occurs in the 
lower shell course. 
The nozzle has several regions of high stresses but 
one of the more critical locations is the inside corner 
where stresses provided by pressure can be three (3) 
times the average membrane stress.  The evaluation 
focuses on this location and is based strictly on the 
pressure cyclic loading condition.  It' is recognized 
that nozzle loads of the type due to temperature effect 
this nozzle region, however, the available published 
papers are.limited to analyzing the effects of internal 
pressure only. 
The results of the stress analysis on the piping 
indicate the circumferential stresses due to internal 
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pressure to be far less than the stresses created by the 
bending mements within the line.  For this reason, the 
analysis is based on the existence of a flaw lying in the 
circumferential direction of the line, 
3.3.3  STRESS INTENSITY FACTORS.  For an analysis of 
this type, assumptions regarding the location, orientation, 
and size of cracks which could exist needs to be made. 
The worst type of flaw which can be postulated is a 
surface crack on the inside.  For the shell, the most 
detrimental orientation for this assumed flaw is perpen- 
dicular to the maximum principal stress, i.e. axial. As 
already noted, the assumed flaw in the piping is assumed 
to be normal to the axial stresses while the flaw in the 
nozzle is assumed to be located on the inside corner as 
shown in Figure 3-1. 
The assumed shape of the flaw needs also to be con- 
sidered.  For the piping and shell, a semi-elliptical 
shape, with a length to depth ratio of six (6), was used. 
This reasonably characterizes the type of flaws reported 
within a pressure vessel(43)# 
Since the fracture,mechanics approach to the design 
against failure is basically a stress intensity consid- 
eration, an expression which relates the material para- 
meters, stresses and defect information in terms of stress 
intensity is required for the analysis.  The expressions 
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for the analysis were taken from the work ^5) sponsored 
by the Pressure Vessel Research Committee (PVRC) of the 
Weld Research Council (WRC).  This work contains the 
recommendations of the PVRC to the ASME on the toughness 
requirements for vessels built to Section III. 
3.3.4  FRACTURE GROWTH.  From the work of Paris<46), the 
crack propagation rate of existing flaws in a structure 
caused by cyclic loading is primarily a function of the 
range of applied stress intensity factor, AK.  In general, 
fatigue crack growth data is correlated reasonably well 
by the expression 
da/dN = C(AK)n 
where n is the slope of the log da/dN versus log AK and 
C is a scaling constant. This expression can be used to 
derive the number of cycles required to extend the 
assumed initial crack to a size that will penetrate 
through the thickness of the wall. The general form of 
the equation is (47); 
N *>      2  
ajn-2/2    afH-2/2 
i—/ 
(n-2) C Mn/2 Acrn 
where C and n are as described above and 
a^:  assumed initial crack depth  I 
af:  thickness of vessel under investigation 
a:  the applied cyclic load range 
M:  flaw shape factor 
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The fatigue crack growth data Was obtained from the 
work of Tobler and Reed(21). The paper summarizes the 
experimental results of the fracture crack growth rate of 
a number of alloys at various cryogenic temperatures. 
3.3.5  PROCEDURE.  In proceeding with the evaluation, 
the fatigue crack propagation threshold, AK^, was first 
determined.  This is the stress intensity factor range 
below which fatigue cracks do not propagate under cyclic 
loading.  Barsom^8) discusses the work of several inves- 
tigators on the fatigue crack propagation threshold. The 
data from these investigations show that a conservative 
estimate of the AKt^ can be predicted by the equation 
AKth - 6.5 (1-.85 R) 
where R is the ratio of minimum applied stress to maximum 
applied stress.  This equation indictes that the fatigue 
crack propagation is primarily a function of the stress 
ratio and is independent of chemical composition or 
mechanical properties. 
With regards to the piping, the AK for a through 
wall crack was compared to this criteria.  It was found 
that the AK fell within the range of AK^ thereby con- 
cluding that cracks within the piping will not propagate 
under the assumed thermal cyclic loading. 
The AK associated with a through crack in the shell 
was determined to be above the AKtn threshold criteria 
41 
but below the AK range of the available fatigue crack 
growth data.  For the purpose of this evaluation, the 
assumption is made that fatigue crack propagation occurs 
and is based on the fatigue growth data. 
On the basis of the preceeding information, the 
following evaluation was made. 
(1) Using the initial and final through wall 
crack sizes along with the applied cyclic 
stress from Table 3-1, the number of cycles 
to cause a crack to propagate through the 
wall was determined. 
(2) The calculated number of cycles was compared 
to the estimated cycled to establish a 
safety factor with respect to cycles to 
cause crack propagation through the wall. 
This value is shown in Table 3.1. 
(3) The stress intensity factor associated with 
a through wall crack was determined and 
compared to the fracture toughness, K^c, 
which would Cause an unstable condition. 
This ratio also appears in Table 3.1 as 
the safety factor with respect to fracture 
toughness. 
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Flaw Sizes, mm(in) 
Number of Cycles 
Stress Level, MPa(KSI) 
Stress Intensity, K^c, 
MPa/m (KSl/in) 
Assumed Flaw Sizes 
Safety Factor on Cycles 
Stress Intensity for thru 
wall crack MPa/ni (KSl/in) 
Safety Factor on Fracture 
Toughness 
TABLE 3-1 
SUMMARY OF FRACTURE ANALYSIS 
CRITERIA 
SHELL 
2.16(.085), 4.34M71) 
1560 
122.7(17.8) 
153.7(140) 
RESULTS 
SHELL 
2.16(.085)   4.34M71) 
21.2        5.0 
26.9(24.5)   26.9(24.5) 
5.7 5.7 
NOZZLE 
3.18(.125), 6.35(.25) 
1560 
122.7(17.8) 
153.7(140) 
NOZZLE 
3.18(.125)   6.35(.25) 
1.5 .3 
55.9(50.9)   55.9(50.9) 
2.7 2.7 
3.3.6  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS.  The analysis provides a 
quantitative means in assessing the fatigue resistance 
and fracture toughness of the design. The results 
indicate the nozzle to be the most susceptable having 
the lowest margin with respect to both number of cycles 
and fracture toughness. The margin would be somewhat 
lower if the effects of the nozzle loadings were con- 
sidered. There is, however, some degree of conservatism 
in the stress intensity value K^c which was used./ The 
stress intensity value is based on section thicknesses 
greater than those in the vesse^-^A decrease in thick- 
ness would lower the con&t/raint around a crack thus 
giving an increase in fracture toughness.  The increase 
in fracture toughness with decrease of section size was 
demonstrated on the 9% Ni steeld^) . Fracture toughness 
values for 6 to 12mm sections, typical of the size range 
of this design, generally ranged thirty (30) to seventy 
(70) percent higher than those for sections around 30mm 
thick. 
Finally, with respect to the nozzles, a crack 
located in this region should only propagate a limited 
distance into the vessel where relatively low stresses 
would permit crack arrest. 
The results also demonstrate that the vessel design 
supports the leak-be,f ore-break concept, that a detectable 
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leak can be supported by the material without resulting 
in disruptive failure.  The use of this concept, however, 
would require the installation of leak detection equip- 
ment to monitor the annular space. This approach has 
been taken in the design of LNG tanks where fracture 
mechanism analysis is used to compute the minimum flaw 
size that will allow leakage of sufficient gas to be 
sensed by the detector(13,14). 
In summary, the results demonstrate the high toler- 
ance the materials of construction have to flaws.  In 
addition, fatigue failure in the piping is unlikely and 
failure by brittle fracture appears extremely remote. 
3.4   ACCIDENT CONDITIONS THAT COULD CAUSE VESSEL FAILURE 
The causes and consequences of all accidents that 
could conceivably lead to loss of vessel integrity are 
not considered in this report. Sighted below are some 
examples of possible accidents not covered by the failure 
statistics discussed in Section 4. 
Overpressurization:  Overpressurization may occur 
due to failure of the safety relief devices to function 
or could result from inadequate pressure relieving 
capacity conditions not covered by the design specifi- 
cation.  Depending on the pressure, the vessel could be 
expected to withstand minor distortion or in the unlikely 
event of gross overpressurization, complete distortion. 
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To minimize the potential for failure by overpressuri- 
zation, the owner/operator has incorporated redundant 
safety devices. The effect of the redundant safety 
relief system is a probability to failure by overpres- 
surization of 1 X 10~7 events per year. 
Copldown: Failure to slowly cool down the vessel 
when bringing it into service could lead to a prohibi- 
tive material temperature condition.  Such an event 
increases the potential for crack initiation and/or 
growth. 
Seismic:  Postulated vessel failures caused by an 
earthquake could result from failure of the support 
system, piping failures, or nozzle failures.  The anchor 
support rods have been designed to take into account 
earthquake factors of 1.1 'g'. 
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4.   FAILURE STATISTICS AND FAILURE PROBABILITY 
4.1  APPROACH 
Operating experience with cryogenic vessels is 
inadequate, both with respect to the number of vessel- 
years of service and the number of known failures, to 
permit a direct statistical determination of the proba- 
bility of failure.  For this reason, the following 
approach is taken which involves 
1. Consideration of operational and failure data 
for other types of pressurized components, 
such as boiler drums and unfired pressure 
vessels. 
2. Comparison of the design, construction, 
inspection, and operating procedures used 
for boiler drums and unfired pressure 
vessels, and estimation of the effects of 
any differences on the relative probability 
of failure of the two types of vessels. 
3. Utilization of the information from the above 
steps, to assess the probability of disruptive 
failure for the cryogenic storage vessel. 
4.2   DEFINITION OF FAILURE 
The words "accident" and "failure" have been used 
in the various reports available to cover a wide range 
of incidents requiring pressure vessels or boilers to 
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be taken out of service for repairs.  To establish a 
definitive basis for the analysis of vessel performance 
Statistics, "vessel failure" is defined herein as a 
condition in which a crack, leak, or other defect has 
developed in the pressure retaining components of the 
vessel, requiring repair or replacement of the vessel. 
Two classes of failure are considered:  1) noncritical - 
a local degradation of the pressure vessel boundary, 
limited to localized cracks which may or may not result 
in leakage; 2) potentially disruptive and disruptive - 
a potential or actual breaching of the vessel by rupture 
of the shell, head or nozzle, leading to rapid release 
of a large volume of the contained pressurized liquid. 
4.3  AVAILABLE FAILURE STATISTICS 
4.3.1  U.S. PRESSURE VESSEL STATISTICS(49,50).  Tne 
failure statistics collected within the U.S. are a 
result of the efforts by the nuclear industry. The statis- 
tical population is predominantly for fossil-fueled 
boiler drums used by electric utilities in the generation 
of electricity. The most meaningful statistics come 
from a survey in which the Edison Electric Institute 
(EEI), American Boiler Manufacturer Association (ABMA) 
and National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessex 
Inspectors (NBBPVI) provided information to the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) on pressure vessels 
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constructed to ASME Section I and Section VIII.  The EEI 
and NBBPVI information dealt with operating experience 
while the ABMA data pertained to fabrication information. 
The EEI data included 5120 vessels which had experienced 
22/692 vessel service years with only one occurrence of 
a noncritical event.  The ABMA data pertaining to the 
number of ASME Section 1 and Section VIII pressure 
vessels for fossil fueled fired water-tube boilers 
installed in central station electric utility plants 
cover over 33,000 vessels for the surveyed period. 
Most of these vessels were ASME Section 1 steam drums 
and headers. The ASME Section VIII vessels were prin- 
cipally feedwater heaters. To obtain a larger and more 
significant vessel population, the data was extrapolated 
back in time to estimate the total number of comparable 
pressure vessels manufactured for central station boilers 
and feedwater heaters.  The period chosen corresponded 
to service years from 1943 to 1972. The extrapolation 
was based on the reported statistics of the ABMA for the 
number of vessels manufactured. The results provided a 
conservative estimate of 68,317 vessels with 725,170 
vessel years of service.  Based on this extrapolated 
data along with the fact there were no critical failures 
reported, an upper limit (99% confidence) probability of 
a disruptive failure event occurring in any one vessel 
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year during any one service year was determined to be 
no greater than 6.3 X 10"6. 
4.3.2   UNITED KINGDOM PRESSURE VESSEL STATISTICS.  Stat- 
istical data on pressure vessel failures in the U.K. have 
been reported in three (3) surveys(51-53) which span the 
years 1962-19 78. The most recent by Smith and Warwick 
includes the 103,000 vessel years of the first survey, 
1962-1967, the 105,400 vessel years of the second survey, 
1967-1972 and the 104,370 vessel year covering 1973-1978 
with some 20,000 pressure vessels and piping being 
reported.  The vessels which are predominantly from 
power plant service include those built to design codes 
similar in construction to ASME Section VIII. The piping 
included in the survey reflects that built to comparable 
pressure vessel standards.  Results of the survey indi- 
cate that for the 20,000 pressure vessels with over 
310,000 vessel years of service, the critical failure 
rate averages 4.2 X 10~5 per vessel year and for a 99% 
confidence limit the value is 8.3 X 10  per vessel 
year. The terms potentially dangerous and catastrophic 
as used in the survey are judged to relate to the 
failure categories as defined in this report. The 
report also contains information on the defect causes, 
mechanisms, location and materials involved.  In reviewing 
the reported critical failures, the following statistics 
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were derived:  1) Of the reported failures, 73% were 
associated with vessels having less than 10 years of 
service.  This tends to support the ASME philosophy, 
which by Section XI requires more inspection early in 
the vessel life as opposed to the more traditionally 
evenly spaced inspection intervals.  2) Piping failures 
accounted for 64% of the failures.  3) There were six 
(6) failures related to failure modes not relevant to 
a cryogenic application. Excluding these failures, 
the probability of failure instead of being 4.2 X 10~5 
would then be 1.6 X 10"^ for a critical failure. 
4.3.3   FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY PRESSURE VESSEL 
FAILURE STATISTICS.  The Institut fur Reactor- 
sicherheit der Technischen Uberwachungs-Vereine (Institute 
for Reactor Safety of the Technical Inspection Associa- 
tions) has, on a continuing basis, accumulated the largest 
body of pressure vessel data available in the world. The 
statistics represent a rapidly increasing number of 
vessels and vessel-years of operation. As of 1972, there 
were over 470,000 vessels in the data set comprising over 
4.3 million vessel years of service. However, little is 
published regarding the design, fabrication, and opera- 
ting practice for many of these vessels. 
These statistics have provided the basis for several 
papers giving studies of failure probabilities.  From 
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these studies, failure rates have been determined to 
be in the range from .27 X 10-5 to 6.9 X 10-5(54,55). 
4.4 PROBABILITY OF A DISRUPTIVE PRESSURE VESSEL FAILURE 
On the basis of the first U.K. survey and the other 
sighted vessel statistics, the Advisory Committee on 
Reactor Safeguards concluded(49) that an appropriate 
99% confidence upper bound for probability of critical 
failure of non-nuclear vessels to be less than 1 X 10~5 
per vessel year.  In arriving at this value, the ABMA 
data was recognized as the most useful and significant 
having the largest data base. This same value was also 
concluded in a later report by Bush'5*>) j.n which the 
same failure statistics were examined along with the 
second U.K. survey. The conclusions from these studies 
are generalizations and provide some indication of the 
norm that has been achieved with current standards of 
design, materials, construction and inspection. 
4.5 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BOILER PRACTICE AND CRYOGENIC 
PRACTICE 
The assessment of the cryogenic storage vessel 
reliability is based primarily on boiler statistics 
because no substantial body of statistical data is avail- 
able for other components in comparable service.  It is 
recognized that there are important differences between 
boiler and cryogenic practice, and this section reviews 
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conditions that might be considered as either favorable 
or unfavorable to the reliability of the cryogenic 
storage vessel as compared to that of boilers. 
4.5.1 DESIGN DIFFERENCES.  The same general design 
formulas and rules used in the design of boilers have 
also been used in the design of the cryogenic vessel. 
The cryogenic vessel however, is a less complex design 
and therefore, the number of areas where localized and 
secondary stresses could exist are less than would be 
found in a boiler design. When considering the design 
rules do not require detailed analysis of these high 
stressed areas but rely only on the safety factor to 
account for these conditions, a less complex design 
would tend to be more, reliable.  In addition, the 
detailed analysis of the higher stressed regions in 
the cryogenic vessel design, as described in Section 2, 
has verified the stress levels to be within acceptable 
limits. 
4.5.2 MATERIAL DIFFERENCES. Materials for any pressure 
vessel application need to possess some degree of material 
toughness.  In comparison with the broad range of 
materials used for the vessels included in the failure 
data, the 9% Ni steel and 304 stainless steel of the 
cryogenic vessel have far superior toughness qualities. 
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The use of these materials together with the control 
measures to assure uniform properties and high toughness 
gives the cryogenic vessel a decided reliability advantage. 
4.5.3 FABRICATION AND INSPECTION DIFFERENCES.  The 
large size and unique design features of the cryogenic 
vessel require fabrication techniques that differ in many 
respects from those used in boiler construction.  Like- 
wise, some of the specialized skills unique to the fabri- 
cation of a complete boiler are not required for a 
cryogenic storage vessel. By the nondestructive exam- 
inations and testing, however the different fabrication 
techniques are verified.  For the cryogenic vessel, the 
nondestructive examination and testing program provides 
adequate assurance that the fabrication techniques 
employed will yield a reliable vessel and are comparable 
to those used in boilers. 
4.5.4 OPERATING DIFFERENCES. 
Contained Fluid:  In boilers, there must be good control 
of water chemistry to protect against corrosion and scale 
formation.  In a cryogenic vessel, the problem of corro- 
sion is nonexistent due to the low temperature of the 
liquid. 
Cyclic Loadings:  The number of pressure and temperature 
cyclic loads for a boiler are far greater than those 
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associated with the cryogenic storage vessel.  In 
addition, the analysis completed in Section 3 demon- 
strates the fatigue resistance qualities of the cryo- 
genic vessel design. 
4.5.5  CONCLUSION.  In view of the previous facts, the 
reliability of the cryogenic storage vessel is judged to 
be greater than that of a boiler. 
4.6   ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBABILITY OF DISRUPTIVE FAILURE 
FOR THE CRYOGENIC STORAGE VESSEL 
In consideration of all the facts presented, the 
probability of disruptive failure of the cryogenic 
storage vessel.is judged to be significantly lower in 
comparison to the vessels contained in the statistical 
data. This statement is based on the following: 
1) The statistical failure data is comprised 
largely of ASME Section I boiler drums. 
From Section 4.5 the cryogenic vessel was 
judged to have a reliability advantage and 
therefore a failure rate lower than a Section 
I boiler design.  This conclusion was based on 
the differences in material, design, fabrication 
and inspection. 
2) The balance of the statistical data includes 
other types of vessels.  Judging from the 
large number of vessels which span a long 
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service period, the statistics are likely to 
include many vessels' of lower quality and 
lesser inspection requirements. 
As a result, the conclusion is made that the disrup- 
tive failure rate for the cryogenic storage vessel is on 
an order of one magnitude less than the value which was 
established for pressure vessels as reported in Section 
4.4.  On this basis, the probability of disruptive failure 
for the cryogenic storage vessel is considered to be less 
than 1.4 X 10~6 per vessel year.  The quantitative assess- 
ment was established by studying the more significant 
factors which enhance the reliability of the cryogenic 
storage vessel and assigning values to these factors. 
This type of probability synthesis is somewhat analogous 
to the fault-tree analysis and is similar to the approach 
taken by O'Niel and Jordan (5?) in assessing the probabil- 
ity of vessel failure between inservice inspections. 
To determine the probability of critical failure for 
the cryogenic vessel the following expression is used: 
Pe = Pa X P;L X P2 X ...Pn.  Pa is the probability 
that failure in design, material and construction will 
lead to a failure in a vessel constructed to ASME Section 
VIII requirements.  P^, P2, Pn are the reliability 
enhancing factors which are assessed to have values in 
the range of 1 - 10~1. 
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TABLE 4-1 
ASSIGNED VALUES FOR ASSESSING CRYOGENIC STORAGE VESSEL RELIABILITY 
ITEM ASSIGNED VALUE 
en 
Pa 1 X 10-5 
Pi .8 
P2 .8 
p3 .7 
P4 .7 
P5 1.0 
p6 .8 
p7 .7 
Pfl .8 
DESCRIPTION 
Probability of failure 
Detailed stress  analysis 
Fracture analysis 
Material qualities 
Material controls 
Nondestructive examination 
Operating differences 
Vessel age 
Vessel wall thickness 
The values assigned to the equation in arriving 
at the probability of critical failure appear in Table 
4-1. As shown in the Table, the improvement in the 
reliability has been achieved by a modest assumption 
of the reliability enhancing factors. 
4.7   FURTHER IMPROVEMENT TO THE FAILURE PROBABILITY 
The U.K. survey<53) indicated that thirty-three (33) 
percent of the reported failures were found by leakage. 
This indicates that leakage can provide a useful advance 
warning of a potentially dangerous situation.  In the 
work of O'Niel and Jordan(57)f  the authors assessed the 
probability that leakage will fail to reveal a poten- 
tially dangerous failure as 1 to 10"^-. As demonstrated 
in Section 3, the vessel design supports the concept of 
leak-before-failure. ,With the proposed installation of 
leak detection equipment, the reliability of the vessel 
can be further enhanced. 
In addition, the owner/operator plans to remove the 
vessel from service for an inspection of the interior 
surfaces. With regards to inservice inspection, consid- 
erable efforts have been made to quantify the degree of 
enhancement as a function of the level of inservice 
inspection.  Cave and Holmes(58) suggested a factor of 
about 100 between failure probability for no inspection 
versus full inspection and a factor of 10 for partial 
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inspection.  O'Niel and Jordan(53) suggested similar 
relationships with a factor range of 10 to 100 depending 
on the extent of inspection. 
To assess the enhancing effects of the installation 
of leak detection equipment and the inservice inspection/ 
values of .8 and .5 respectively are assigned and 
included in the probability of failure equation.  By 
including these factors, the probability of failure than 
becomes 5.6 X 10"^ per vessel year. 
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